However, this problem is far from unsolvable. Should Australia invoke paragraph 14, it would be a novel case in which many complex legal and technical questions would require answers (though some questions are explained by the IAEA safeguards system’s seminal documents, as shown in this brief). To date, paragraph 14 has been invoked only once-by Canada, which was interested in nuclear-powered submarines but ultimately decided not to pursue them, so no arrangement with the IAEA was made. This provision is spelled out in paragraph 14 of INFCIRC/153 and is understood to apply to naval nuclear propulsion.Īny country invoking paragraph 14 must make an arrangement with the IAEA so that the non-application of safeguards will happen only while the nuclear material is being used in the non-prohibited activity. The treaty does require countries that are party to it (with the exception of the five nuclear weapon states) to conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of safeguards “on all material in all peaceful nuclear activities.” These so-called comprehensive safeguards agreements, based on INFCIRC/153, contain a provision that a member state can invoke for the “non-application” of safeguards to nuclear material used in activities that are not prohibited under the agreement. However, it makes no mention of non-explosive military uses such as naval nuclear propulsion. The treaty also prohibits nuclear weapon states from facilitating nuclear weapons acquisition by others. The NPT-the international community’s foundational nuclear treaty-prohibits non-nuclear weapon states from receiving nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices, or control over nuclear weapons manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or receiving any assistance in doing so. The legal framework and nuclear-powered submarines. However, the way in which some countries have responded to the initiative in the IAEA’s Board of Governors has been unconstructive. Insistence that the AUKUS effort should set a strong precedent and be conducted in close consultation with the IAEA is well founded. They involve militarily sensitive nuclear technology that to date only the five nuclear weapon states recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) command. Nuclear-powered submarines are no small thing. Ultimately, China dropped its resolution when it failed to win support beyond a few other IAEA member states. The Chinese delegation attempted not only to push a separate resolution on AUKUS and its implications for IAEA safeguards, but also to insist on AUKUS-related language in other conference resolutions-including resolutions on the IAEA’s safeguards system, the application of safeguards in North Korea, and even the IAEA’s budget. On the other hand, whether to address AUKUS in a conference resolution (and if so, how) was the subject of intense debate during conference deliberations. On the one hand, in his opening remarks Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said unequivocally that the drafters of the document on which the vast majority of safeguards agreements are based (an information circular known as INFCIRC/153) recognized that military naval nuclear propulsion was a permitted activity. This issue played out in dramatic fashion in September at the IAEA’s annual General Conference in Vienna. What has raised concern is the alarm over AUKUS from a small but vocal minority of countries, clearly driven by geopolitics rather than safeguards. As these measures are in place for Australia, I saw no need for concern. While nuclear-powered submarines in a non-nuclear weapon state’s possession would be unprecedented, safeguards-technical measures implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)-are designed to ensure that sensitive nuclear technology is not diverted toward the manufacture of nuclear weapons. When I first heard the announcement, I was unconcerned. Since the September 2021 announcement of the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) partnership entailing a “trilateral effort of 18 months to seek an optimal pathway” to help Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines, experts opposed to such acquisition have made grave predictions about it.
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